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Quantitative methods of analyzing system reliability
have been recognized as an important need since the end
of World War II. Early objects of reliability analysis
were pieces of electronic communication and control
equipment whose functional requirements were relatively
easy to specify. Accordingly, what constituted the
"success1' or ''failure" of such systems could be described
in a straightforward manner and reliability measures
such as "probability of success,", "mean-time-to-failure,"
^availability," etc. were relatively easy to formulate.
During the last thirty years, however, the structural
and functional complexity of man-made systems has in-
creased trememdously, particularly in the computer field,
and the reliability analysis task has likewise become much
more complex. This is especially true in the case of
fault-tolerant computing systems, where various types of
structural redundancy must be accounted for in the analysis.
Beginning with the reliability analysis of fault-
tolerant logic networks [1] and relay networks [2],
a considerable amount of effort has been devoted to
'developing analytic methods for assessing the reliability
of computing systems. Recent contributions in this regard
include the analysis of fault-tolerant systems based on
architecture-level descriptions of their structure [3]-[6].
In general, these methods are based on formal models which,
at some desired level of abstraction, represent the structure
of the systems to be analyzed. Given a particular class
of models, the ability to "rely on" a system is then quanti-
fied via one or more "reliability measures" (defined on
the model class). In defining such measures, what it means
to "rely on" a system is usually expressed in terms of some
underlying concept of system "success" or "failure."
Indeed, the measure that is commonly referred to as
"reliability" can be generally defined as "the probability
of system success in its use environment" (see [7], for
example). Thus, it is the meaning of success (or failure)
that gives meaning to a reliability measure and, in turn,
to any analysis that uses the measure.
In the discussion that follows, we wish to focus on
the last of these issues, namely the concept of "success"
as it pertains to the reliability analysis of computing
systems. In particular, we contend that success criteria
should be "computation-based" so that they can adequately
reflect the computational needs of the user. This is in
contrast to "structure-based" success criteria which
can specify what is required of a system's structure,
but can specify what constitutes successful behavior
only as it depends on the success of the structure. In
relatively simple computing systems where computational
integrity is closely related to structural integrity
(e.g., as the success of addition relates to the struc-
tural integrity of an adder), such structure-based success
criteria may indeed suffice. On the other hand, if the
success of a computation depends not only on structure but
also on such things as the state of the system prior to
initiation of the computation, the time of initiation, and
the input data, then structure-based criteria cannot
express variations in success that result from such depen-
dencies. Consequently, reliability measures that utilize
structure-based criteria may not be indicative of a system's
ability to successfully perform computations.
The purpose of the discussion that follows is to
formally establish the point we have just made. We begin
with an example that is intended to illustrate the need
for computation-based reliability analysis, that is, analysis
that utilizes computation-based success criteria. We then
develop a formal model of a computer that is just complex
enough to admit to the formulation of computation-based
criteria and, in turn, reliability measures that utilize
these criteria. Finally, we apply the formal model to
illustrate how the results of a computation-based analysis
can differ from those of a structure-based analysis.
2: The Need
To illustrate the need for computation-based
reliability analysis consider, for example, the reliability
equations that have been developed for systems employing
modular redundancy and sparing [3], [4]. These
equations are based solely on a structural representation
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(at the architecture level) of the system in question
and, consequently, whatever the underlying success
criteria may be, they too are structure-based.
In particular, therefore, these criteria apply as
well to a fault-tolerant aerospace computer as they do
to a fault-tolerant pocket calculator. Let us examine,
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on the other hand, how the computational requirements
for two such systems might differ.
A computer housed in an aircraft or spacecraft
is called on to perform a variety of functions at different
times and for different lengths of time during the course
o
of a flight (see [8], for example). A pocket calculator
may be required only to add or multiply (any time it is
called on to do so). What constitutes successful com-
putation is likewise very different. In the case of an
aircraft or spacecraft computer, success criteria will
vary according to what function is computed and when
the computation takes place. For example, more strict
criteria might apply to flight control computations
during an automatic landing than to graphic display
computations performed while en route. Consequently,
a structural failure of a given type might cause a
computational failure if it occurs during an automatic
landing, but might be tolerated if it occurs before
that time. In the case of a pocket calculator, on the
other hand, success criteria are simple and essentially
independent of what is computed or when computations
take place.
Given these differences in computational requirements,
as they are perceived by the users of each system,
let us examine the consequences of applying structure-
based reliability equations of the type referred to at
the outset. In the case of a pocket calculator, the
reliability values determined by the equations may be
quite meaningful to the user since, here, the success
or failure of a computation corresponds closely to the
success or failure of the structure (as defined by the
structure-based success criteria of the model). In the
case of an aircraft or spacecraft computer, on the
other hand, the reliability values determined by the
equations may be misleading since, in general, the success
or failure of computations will not correspond to the
success or failure of the computer's structure. In
6particular, as noted earlier, a structural failure might
correspond to computational failure at one time (while
landing) and to computational success at another time
(while en route). In other words, "success in the use
environment" may differ considerably from the kind of
structure-based success criteria that models of this type
employ.
The example just cited is indicative of the need to
more fully account for the behavior of a computer (i.e.,
the computations it performs) when analyzing its relia-
bility. To accomplish this, reliability measures must
refer to concepts of system success which involve more
than just the status of various components or subsystems.
For systems described at the architecture-level,
this need has already been acknowledged by Bouricious,
et al., [5], [6] through the introduction of parameter
called "coverage, " According to thei-r defi-n-iti-on-, eove-r-age
is "the conditional probability that, given the existence of
a failure in the operational system, the system is able to
recover and continue information processing with no
permanent loss of essential information." Thus, coverage
involves the kind of "computation-based" success criteria,
the use of which we are advocating.
To analytically evaluate coverage and, more generally,
any computation-based reliability measure, the system models
used must be capable of representing behavior (compu-
tations) as well as structure (the computer). In this
regard, one should not be misled by the use of the coverage
parameter in connection with purely structural models.
Although such models can employ coverage as a parameter
(as was done when the concept was first introduced [5]),
they cannot be used to evaluate the parameter. The latter
problem is the type of problem that we are concerned with
here and one that we feel deserves further investigation.
In the remainder of this paper, our objective is to
establish, in quite simple and general terms, the kinds
of things that need to be considered in developing models
and measures for computation-based reliability analysis.
3. Computers with Faults
We begin by viewing a digital computer as a rather
general type of system which, at discrete points in time,
receives input data which, in turn, effects changes in the
system's internal state. It will be assumed that time is
represented by the natural numbers, i.e., the time base
is the set T = {0,1,2,...} . It will be further assumed
that the state set is "coordinatized" where a subset of the
coordinates represent the values of those state variables
that are observable as output variables.
The transition structure of such a system may vary
with time because faults (structural failures) occur or
because the system is reconfigured in an attempt to
recover from a fault. At a given instant of time the
8structure is fixed, however, and is described by a
transition function which determines the state 'of the
computing system at time i + 1, given the state at time i
and the input received at time i. Formalizing this
notion, we have:
Definition: A (formal) computer is a system
C = (X,Q,A)
where
X is a nonempty set, the input set of C,
Q is a nonempty set, the state set of C,
A is a sequence of functions
A = (60,61,62,...)
where 6 . : Q x X -> Q, the transition function of C
at time i (i e T) .
Thus a computer, as defined above, is a ""discrete-time,
time-varying system whose structure at time i is des-
cribed by transition function 6. . In particular, if
q e Q is the state of C at time i and a e X is the input
received at time i then 6.(q,a) is the state of C at time
i + 1 . In case structure does not vary with time,
that is,
(3.1)
then C is time-invariant. Thus if C = (X,Q,A) is time-
invariant, A is uniquely determined by 6g and C can
alternatively be regarded as a (state) sequential machine
with (fixed) transition function 6 = 6Q .
, A computer is finite-input if |X| < «° and finite-
state if |Q| < °° . Note that even in case a computer
is both finite-input and finite-state, it is not finitely
specifiable unless its structure A is finitely specifiable.
However, in the subsequent application of this model to
reliability analysis, all computers (both fault-free and
faulty) of concern in the analysis will indeed be finitely
specifiable.
The most general view of computer behavior is that
of "string manipulation." Beginning in some initial
state qn, determined by the program to be executed and
by stored data, at some initial time i, C receives an
input sequence of symbols a^ a., . . . a .. where a. e X is
interpreted as the input received at time i + j . In
response to this input sequence, there results a sequence
(trajectory) of states q^q^...q where q. e Q is inter-
preted as the state of C at time i + j . Thus the
"state behavior" of C may be viewed as a function from
T x x* into Q where T is the time base, X* is the set
of all finite-length sequences of input symbols (including
the null sequence A), and Q is the set of all finite-
length sequences of states. More precisely, if C = (X,Q,A)
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and q e Q , the state-behavior of C in q is a function
a : T x x* .-»• Q defined inductively as follows for all
i e T:
i) aq(i,A) = q
If x e X* , a e X:
ii) aq(i,xa) = aq(i,x)6.. (q1 ,a)
where j = £g(x) (the length of x)
and q' is the final state of a (i,x)
It is easy to verify that this formal notion of state-
behavior captures the intuitive notion discussed above.
Note that a maps input sequences of length n into state
trajectories of length n + 1 .
Having established the concepts of "computer" and
"state-behavior," we adopt a concept of "computation"
that is somewhat more general than usually considered.
Since computational errors may be due to erroneous initial
states, initial times, and input sequences, as well as
to faulty computers, we regard a computation as con-
sisting of four things: an initial state q, an initial
\
time i, an input sequence x and a state sequence y . More
precisely, a computation (over X and Q) is a quadruple
(q,i,x,y) where q e Q , i e T , x e X * and y e Q such that
= &g(x) + 1. Accordingly, q, i, x, and y are
referred to as the initial state, initial time, input
sequence and state trajectory (respectively) of the com-
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putation. Relative to a particular computer C, a com-
putation of C is a computation of the form (q,i,x,a (i,x))
The fundamental question of deciding whether a computer
is a "success in its use environment" will be based on
the nature of such computations. However, even more
basic than the notion of a computational error is the concept
of a "fault," that is, a transient or permanent change
in computer structure that may, in turn cause errors.
In terms of the concepts of a "representation scheme"
and a "system with faults" [ 9], the "specification class
e^and "realization class" &l that we wish to consider
is the class of all computers (as defined above), that
is, both &r and £n> are equal to the class
*@ = (C|C is a computer} .
Moreover, we will restrict our attention to faults that
occur during the use of a computer (as opposed to faults
that occur during the design process) and so, in the
representation scheme (< '^,< '^,p) , p is taken to be the
identity function. In this representation scheme, a
"computer with faults" will be defined as follows.
The "fault-free" specification, that is, the des-
cription of the underlying system as it exists before
any physical failures occur, will be assumed time-
invariant (see condition (3.1)). This is not unreasonable
since many physical systems and, in particular, most
computing systems can be represented as time-invariant
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systems as long as there are no structural changes due
to physical failures. Suppose now that a physical failure
does occur where the failure may be transient, permanent,
or a combination of the two, that is, a permanent physical
failure that has a transient component while the permanent
change is taking place. Such physical failures can then
be represented by (formal) faults as follows. If C =
(X,Q,A) is a computer, a fault of C (at time i) is a
triple (T,7r,i) where
T: Q x X -> Q, the transient component,
ir; Q x x ->• Q, the permanent component,
i is a nonnegative integer, the time of occurrence (,i e T),
The interpretation of (i,7r,i) is a physical failure
that occurs between time i and time i + 1 . T is the
transition function that the failing system exhibits while
/
the failure is taking place and IT is the transition
function that the system exhibits after the failure has
taken place. Thus, if f = (x,7T,i) is a fault of computer
f
C = (X,Q,A) , the result of f is the computer C =
(X,Q,Af) where, if Af = (6j|j, 6* , S* > • • • ) then
6. if 0 < j < i
(3.3)
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If, in the result of f = (T,TT,JL), there is no permanent
change in structure, that is, TT = <5-_-i then f is a
transient fault (at time i). A fault (ir,T,i) which
represents no change whatsoever, that is, TT = 8.J i and
T = 6. -. , is referred to as a null or improper faulti—j. ~~—^ ——^ —
(at time i). Given this notion of a fault at time i,
by a "fault" we will generally mean a sequence of faults
that represents a succession of physical failures. More
precisely, a (multiple) fault of C is a sequence
f = (f ,f ,...,f )
xl 2 xk
where i-, < iQ < ... < i, and f. is a fault of C at time i.1 - . 1 - k i. j
The corresponding result of f is an immediate generalization
of definition (3.3).
Given these concepts of "fault," "result of a fault,"
we obtain the following specialization of the general
notion of a "system with faults."
Definition: A computer with faults is a triple (C,F,cp)
such that -
i) C e «? where C is time invariant,
ii) F is a set of faults of C, where F contains at
least one null fault,
r;
ill) cp: F -»• <@ , where (f>(f) = C (the result of f).
In keeping with our earlier interpretations of these
objects, if (C,F,cp) as a computer with faults, C will be
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referred to as the fault-free computer and if f is not a
f
null fault,. C will be referred to as faulty.
To illustrate each of the ingredients of a computer
with faults, consider the triply modular redundant (TMR)
configuration:




X = Q = {0,1}
A = {"6,"6,"6,.. .} .




Q = {(q1,q2,q3,q4)|qi e (0,1}}
with q.., q2 and q., representing the states of modules 1,
2 and 3 (respectively) and q4 representing the value of
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the voter output. The transition structure
A = (60,61,62,...)
is given by a fixed function 6 = 6 . for all i, where
<S((q1,q2,q3,q4),a) = (q.[ ,q^ , q^, y (q^ , qg , qg) )
with q'. = 6(q. ,a) and y equal to the majority function
(realized by the voter).
To illustrate the concepts of a "fault" and the
"result of a fault," suppose that at time 2 there is a
transient struck-at-one failure at the output of module 1
and at time 4 there is a permanent stuck-at-zero
failure at the output of module 3. Then this succession
of failures is represented by the (multiple) fault
f = (f2,f4)
where f~ is the fault at time 2 and f4 is the fault at
time 4. More specifically, f« is the fault
where (letting ql = 6(q.,a))
and - Tr = 6





f fThe result of the fault f is the computer C =({0,1},Q,A ) where
^ 6 if 0 £ j < 2
T2:if j = 2
TT2 if j = 3
T4 if j = 4
^ *4 if j > 4 .
4. Tolerance Relations for Computations
Given the class of computers with faults (over some
specified input set X and state set Q), we now consider
the basic issue raised at the outset of this discussion,
namely, the formulation of computation-based success
criteria. Although such criteria could be formally
specified in a variety of specific ways, the following
general formulation appears to be quite reasonable.
We view a particular computation realized by
some possibly faulty computer as being a "success" if
it is "within tolerance" of the desired (error-free)
computation. In these terms, what is regarded as a
successful^computation (in the use environment) is
specified by a "tolerance relation" on the set of all
possible computations. In general, such a relation can
be formally defined as follows.
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Definition : If U is the set of all computations (over
X and Q), a tolerance relation (for computations) is a
relation 0 on U such that a is reflexive.
The reflexive condition of the definition gays
simply that every computation is within tolerance of
itself. Accordingly the strongest tolerance relation
is the relation of equality; the weakest is the relation
a = U x U where every computation is within tolerance
of every other computation. The latter says that anything
the computer : does is acceptable and therefore represents
a theoretical extreme as opposed to a practical one.
It should also be noted that the concept of tolerance,
as defined above, is general enough to permit tolerable
deviations in initial state, initial time and input as well as
tolerable deviations in the state trajectory. Thus, for
example, if (q,i,x,y) were the desired computation and
a delay of up to 5 time steps could be tolerated then
However, the purpose of the present investigation can be
adequately served by examining how internal causes
(faults) affect the state trajectory of a computation,
and neglecting external causes that might affect initia-
lization, timing, and input.
Given a computer with faults (C,F,cp) and some
specified tolerance relation a, it is now possible to define
precisely what is meant by computational success. To
18
this end, suppose f e F, u is a computation of the
(possibly faulty) computer C and u1 is the computation
of the fault-free computer C where u' has the same
initial state, initial time, and input sequence as u.
Then, assuming no external causes of error, we can regard
u as a "success" if u is within tolerance of u'. More
precisely, if a is a tolerance relation and f e F:
f
Definition: A computation u of C is a q-success if
ua(q,i,x,a (i.x)) where q, i, and x are the initial state,
initial time and input sequence of u. Otherwise u is a
q-failure.
f
If a computation of C is a q-failure, we will say
it is caused by f. In case f can cause no q-failures,
then f is q-tolerated. When the tolerance relation is
understood, we will drop the reference to q and refer
to a computation u as simply a "success" or, in the
opposite case, a "failure."
Since state trajectories can be distinguished by a
tolerance relation, the concept of failure, as defined
above, can capture internal computational failures as
well as input-output failures. To illustrate, let C be
the TMR configuration considered earlier and suppose q
is the relation of equality on U (i.e., uqu1 iff u = u1).
Then the fault f = (f2>f4), considered in the earlier
example, can cause q-failures even though f cannot cause
19
input-output failures (assuming the modules are properly
initialized). To be more specific, let us suppose the
module transition function a is given by:
(q ,a )









Then, for example, if q = (0,0,0,0), i = 0, and x = 101
then
aj(i,x) = (0,0,0,0)(1,1,1,1)(1,1,1,1)(1,0,0,0)
since the transition function at time 2 is T~ . On
the other hand
aq(i,x) = (0,0,0,0)(1,1,1,1)(1,1,1,1)(0,0,0,0) .
Thus the computations u = (q,i,x,a (x)) and u' =
T.
(q,i,x,a (x)) are not equal, that is u ^ u' and hence u
T.
is a a-failure.
To continue the example, suppose a' is a second
tolerance relation which requires only that values on
the output line (coordinate 4) be what they should be.
More precisely, (q,i,x,y)a'(q,i,x,y') if y and y' have
the same length, say n, and the j state of y has the
20
the same 4 coordinate as the j state of y1, i =
0,1,...,n-1 . Given that a1 is the tolerance relation
of interest, it can be shown that the fault f = (f0,f.)£ 4t
does not cause any o"-failures (provided all module states
are the same when the computation begins). In other i
words, although f can cause internal failures (according
to tolerance relation a), it can cause no input-output
failures (according to tolerance relation a1).
5. Reliability Measures
In general, a "realiability measure" is a function
from some class of systems into some set of numbers (or
product set of numbers) whose value, for a given system,
reflects the ability to rely on that system in some
specified use environment. When viewed in this way,
the concept of a reliability measure includes such
measures as "mean-time-to-failure," "availability,"
"recoverability," etc., as well as the measure "proba-
bility of success (in the use environment)." What we
wish to examine now is how such reliability measures
might be formulated in terms of the computation-based
success criteria developed in the previous section.
The investigation will focus on the measure "probability
of success," although other measures of the type men-
tioned above could be dealt with in a similar fashion.
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In general, to formulate the measure "probability
of success" where, as earlier, success means "success in
the use environment," the probabilistic nature of both
the system and the environment must be taken into account.
In classical structure-based formulations, the environment
is usually described by a single parameter t (the duration
of time that the system is utilized) and assumed to be
deterministic (i.e., it is assumed that t has a known
fixed value when evaluating probability of success).
However, when other aspects of the environment are con-
sidered, such as the computational requirements of the
user, it is more realistic to regard the environment
as probabilistic.
To formalize this view, if (C,F,<p) is a computer
with faults where C = (X,Q,A), the environment of C
can be represented by a probability space
(E, #,PE) (5.1)
where
E = Q x T x x ,
$= {E1 |E' £ E} (the "events" on E) ,
PE : $ -> [0,1] is a probability measure.
Here, an element (q,i,x) in the sample space E describes
an environment wherein the computer is to realize a
computation with initial state q, initial time i, and
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input sequence x. The interpretation of the probability
measure ?„ is the usual one, that is, if E' e <o* then:
£1
P_(E') = the probability that the (experienced)
Ei
environment is in the event E1.
As for the probabilistic nature of the faults of C,
it can be represented by a second probability space
(5.2)
where F is the set of faults of C
& '= {F- |F' c F}
and P- '.' ^  -*• [0,1] is a probability measure.
Again the interpretation of P- is the usual one, that is,
if F' e ^  then:
P-p-(F') = the probability that the (experienced)
fault is in the event F'.
Given the spaces (E, <£?,PE) and (F,^ T,P.p), the proba-
bilistic nature of both the environment and the faults
of C can then be represented by a single space
where G = E x F ,
^ = {G1 |G' £ G} ,
and P : ^  -»• [0,1] is the (unique) probability
measure that satisfies the condition:
23
P({(e,f)}) = PE({e))-PF({f}), for all (e,f) e G (5.3)
Note that Eq. (5.3) expresses an underlying assumption
that environmental events are independent of faults,
which we feel is quite reasonable. If G1 e «^ , the
interpretation of P(G') is the probability that the
(experienced) environment and fault has a description
e and f , .respectively, such that (e,f) e G'.
A probabilistic framework has now been established
for a formal definition of "probability of success in the
use environment" or what we will refer to simply as
"reliability."
Definition: If C = (C,F,<p) is a computer with faults,
a is a tolerance relation on the computations of C, and
P is the probability measure defined by Eq. (5.3) then
the reliability of C (denoted R (C)) is the probability
Ra(C) = P(H)
where H =
(q,i,x,f) f, -the computation (q,i,x,a (i,x))
is a a-success
Note that R may be viewed as a reliability measure (from
computers with faults into the real interval [0,1])
where the value of R for computer C is R (C). Thus the
above definition yields a whole class of reliability measures
that differ according to the choice of a tolerance
relation a .
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6, Analysis of a Read-only Memory
To illustrate the application of computation-based
reliability measures, let us suppose the system to be
analyzed is a 1024 word, 32 bit/word read-only memory
(ROM). Then the ROM (before the occurrence of any
physical failures), can be represented by the fault-
free computer C = (X,Q,A) where
X = {0,1}10
•30
Q = X x Y where Y = {0,1}
and . A =(6,6,6,...}.
To describe the (fault-free) transition function 6 , with
each "address" a e X we associate a word c(a) e Y ,
the "content of a." Then for all q e Q ,
6(q,a)=(a,c(a)).
Suppose further that the physical failures of concern
are memory cell failures that permanently alter the content
of an address. Then, for some specific address b, such
failures can be formally represented by (single) faults
of the form
f(b,i) = (T,TT,i)
where T = IT (i.e., f(b,i) is a permanent fault) and
6(q,a) if a ? b
7r(q,a) =
(a,c), where c / c(a), otherwise,
25
If null-faults of the form f = (6,6,i) are also included,
then the fault set F is the set of all sequences of
single faults, i.e., f e F if and only if, for some
m _> 1 ,
f = (f(b1,i1),f(b2,i2),...,f(bm,im))
where i1 < i0 < ... < i . As for the underlying tolerance
_L . £ • m
relation a , we assume that no readout errors can be
tolerated (i.e., there can be no errors in the Y coor-
dinate values of a state). As no failures are postulated
for the addressing structure (which determines the X
coordinate values), we can therefore take a to be the
relation of equality on the computations of C.
Regarding the environment of the system, let us
suppose the ROM is part of an aircraft computer where it
receives slowly changing address updates at the rate
of 1 per minute. (Time i will be interpreted as the i
minute). Let us suppose further that as inputs change,
the likelihood of repeating a given address is negligible.
Then, for a mission duration of t minutes (where t <_
1024), the environment of the ROM is described by a
probability space (E, (p'.Pg), where E and Jo are as
defined in (5.1), and PE is subject to the condition
that, whenever
26
then i = 0 > A = t , and a. ^ a, if j ^ k .
^- J K
The probabilistic nature of the faults f e F is
determined by that of the physical memory cells.
Assuming that a single cell failure changes the contents
of that cell, a fault f(b,i) corresponds to no failures
in each of the 32 cells (addressed by b) until time i
and then at least one cell failure (among the 32) between
time i and time i + 1. Thus, if cell failures occur
at constant hazard rate X , the value of PF (see (5.2))
for a fault f(b,i) is given by:
PF({f(b,i)» = e 32Xi(i _ e 32X)
-32Xi
The probability of a sequence of single faults can be
formulated in a similar manner.
We now have enough information to determine the
reliability of C according to the measure R . By
definition, RO(C) is the probability P(H) of the event
H consisting of all tuples (q,i,x,f) such that the
f
computation (q,i,x,a (i,x) is a o-success, that is
aj(i.x) = a (i,x) . We note first that P({(q,l,x,o*(i,x))})
will be 0 if i ^  0 , fcg(x) ^ t or the sequence x has
repeated addresses (since P_({(q,i,x)» = 0 under these
Cj
conditions). Thus we need only consider tuples (q,i,x,f)
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such that i = 0 , x = ana1 . . . a 1 , and a . ^ a , i f j ^ k .
*J J- T— X J .K
In this case, it follows that the computation u =
(q, 0,x,a (0,x)) is a a-success if and only if, for each
time i (0 •<_ i <_ T - 1) and for all j such that 0 _< j £ i ,
the fault -f('a. ,j) does not occur in the sequence f.
This will ensure that, for each time i, the (i+1)
•p "i~ Vi
state of a (0,x) is equal to the (i+1) state of
a (0,x). Moreover, since a. occurs exactly once in the
sequence x, no fault f(ai,j) with j > i , will cause




 {f|(q,0,x,a (0,x)) is a a-success} ,x q
• " " i
it follows that
F = n e-32Xi
x
-32Xt(t+l)
- , - . . - e 2
Summing over the environment










Hence R (C) = e 2 . (6.1)
The above example is intended to illustrate the many
concepts introduced in previous sections and, for this
reason, the development has been somewhat more lengthy
than what would normally be required to achieve the end
result. The example also serves to illustrate how a
computation-based reliability measure can differ from
a structure-based measure. In particular, suppose we
consider the usual structure-based success criteria for
the example in question, that is, "no memory cell failures
during the utilization interval t." Since the ROM
has 1024 words with 32 bits/word , the reliability





Comparing Eqs. (6.1) and (6.2), we note first that
the structure-based formula says that the system failure
rate is constant, while the computation-based formula
does not. Second, we note that, even in the case of
maximum utilization for the environmental assumptions
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of (6.1) (i.e., t = 1024) wherein all addresses are
interrogated, the effective failure rate given by the
computation-based measure is only half that of the
structure-based measure. To obtain a more concrete
comparison, suppose that the memory cell hazard rate
-7is 10 failures per hour and the utilization interval
is 10 hours (which might be required of a long-range
aircraft). Then X = 10~ /60 , t = 600 and substituting
in Eq. (6.1):
= . 9904 .
On the other hand, substituting these same values in
(6.2):
R(C) = e ~
= .9680 .
Thus the computation-based measure yields a considerably
higher estimate of the ROM's reliability (in this use
environment) than does the structure-based measure.
Judging by other examples we have looked at, this kind
of difference is typical. In other words, structure-
based measures will often yield a more pessimistic view
of a computer's reliability than is warranted by the
computational needs of the user.
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7. Conclusion
The purpose of this investigation has been to give
a precise meaning to the notion of a computation-based
reliability analysis in terms of a simple but general
model of a computer with faults. This is not to suggest
that the proposed model is the only one that could be
or should be Used in the analysis of a specific class
of computing systems. The investigation does indicate,
however, the kinds of things that should be considered
if reliability measures are to more accurately reflect
computational needs of the user. It is hoped that this
will provide a framework for more detailed investigations
regarding the feasibility of computation-based analysis
methods.
REFERENCES
[1] J. von Neumann, "Probabilistic logics and the
synthesis of reliable organisms from unreliable
components," Automata Studies, (Ed. by C. E. Shannon
and J. McCarthy), Princeton University Press,
Princeton, N.J., 1956, pp. 43-98.
[2] E. F. Moore and C. E. Shannon, "Reliable circuits
using less reliable relays," Journal of the Franklin
Institute, Vol. 262, part I, pp. 191-208, part II,
1956, pp. 281-297.
[3] F. P. Mathur and A. Avizienis, "Reliability analysis
and architecture of a hybrid-redundant digital system:
Generalized triple modular redundancy with self-
repair," Proc. 1970 Spring Joint Computer Conference,
AFIPS Conf. Proc., Vol. 36, 1970, pp. 375-383.
[4] F. P. Mathur, "On reliability modeling and analysis
of ultra-reliable fault-tolerant digital systems,"
IEEE Transactions on Computers, Vol. C-20, No. 11,
November, 1971, pp. 1376-1382.
[5] W. G. Boricius, W. C. Carter, and P. R. Schneider,
"Reliability modeling techniques for self-repairing
computer systems," Proceedings ACM 1969 Annual
Conference, 1969, pp. 295-309.
[6] W. G. Boricious, W. C. Carter, D. C. Jessep,
P. R. Schneider, and A. B. Wadia, "Reliability
modeling for fault tolerant computers," IEEE
Transactions on Computers, Vol. C-20, No. 11,
November, 1971, pp. 1306-1311.
[7] A. M. Breipohl, Probabilistic Systems Analysis,
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York, 1970.
[8] R. S. Ratner, et al., "Design of a fault tolerant
airborne digital computer (Vol. II - Computational
requirements and technology)," Final Report, SRI
Project 1406, Stanford Research Institute, Menlo
Park, California, October, 1973.
[9] J. F. Meyer, "A general model for the study of
fault tolerance and diagnosis," Proc. of the 6th
Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences,
January, 1973, pp. 163-165.
31
